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1. Introduction 
In the last decade or so it has been widely recognised that asset prices play an 
important role in determining business cycles conditions. As Bernanke and Gertler 
(2001) emphasise, asset market boom and busts have been important factors behind 
macroeconomic volatility in both industrial and developing countries. Following the 
financial deregulation in the early 1980s and the increased capital market 
globalization, industrial economies have witnessed an upward trend in asset prices. 
Alongside this trend, stock land and property prices have undergone swings around 
typical business cycle frequencies ranging from three to ten years. For some countries 
such as Japan and the Scandinavian counties during the late 1980s and the early 
1990s, these swings had disruptive effects on domestic financial systems and 
contributed to prolonged recessions. In the U.K. case of 1990-92, the financial system 
withstood the asset price collapse but the ensuing recession was anyway severe.  
 Many recent theoretical and empirical contributions on the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy imply that equity and property prices play an 
important role via wealth effects and balance sheet effects. Mishkin (1999) offers an 
excellent review of all the related arguments. For example, a rise in stock prices 
decreases the perceived level of financial distress by households which leads to 
increased consumption spending. The balance sheet channel implies a positive 
relationship between the firms’ ability to borrow and their net worth which in turn 
depends on asset valuations. This extra credit can be used to purchase goods and 
services and thus stimulates economic activity (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).  
Since banks engage heavily in real estate lending, in which the value of the 
real estate acts as a collateral, swings in property prices lead to increased financial 
instability. The monetary and financial stability objectives are intertwined. Sinclair 
(2000) reminds us that the Central Bank by setting the interest rate controls an 
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important link between the two forms of stability. A low degree of policy smoothness 
may cause an excess volatility in financial markets, especially when the policy is 
delayed. Borio and Lowe (2002) point out that while a low and stable inflation 
environment promotes financial stability, it also raises the likelihood that excess 
demand pressures will first show up in credit aggregates and asset prices rather than in 
consumer prices.  
Goodhart and Hofmann (2001) find that stock price and house price increases 
raise future aggregate demand in many major economies. Monetary policy affects 
asset prices via changes in expected future dividends and/or changes in the discount 
rate, which consequently affect aggregate demand and future inflation through 
balance sheet and wealth effects. Some authors have suggested a pro-active view for 
monetary policy, claiming that macroeconomic performance can be improved by 
reacting to asset price bubbles, even if conventionally measured inflation appears to 
be under control (Cecchetti et al., 2000).  
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) show that such results depend crucially on 
assumptions about the structure of the bubble and argue that asset prices should only 
be used in inflation forecasts. In their view, an inflation-targeting Central Bank should 
consider asset prices movements only if they affect inflationary forces through wealth 
effects on aggregate demand. Goodhart and Hoffman (2000) estimate the potential 
benefit from including asset prices in a model that predicts inflation. By comparing 
the inflation forecasting properties of reduced form equations with and without asset 
prices they show that, particularly at the two-year horizon, house prices are useful 
indicators for consumer price inflation. Goodhart (1999) has recommended that, since 
asset prices represent the current price of claims on future as well as current 
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consumption, policymakers should consider a broader price measure that includes 
housing and stock market indices1.  
 The main objective of this paper is to provide some further insight into the 
interest rate setting behavior of the Bank of England (BoE), by estimating reaction 
functions that have been augmented to take into account the effect of asset price 
inflation. We depart from the traditional approach that considers the exchange rate as 
determinant of aggregate demand and interest rates, and focus on two other important 
asset prices, equity and house prices. The results indicate that UK monetary policy 
reacts to asset price fluctuations, especially when they originate from the housing 
market.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses 
the properties of the data. In Section 3 we provide some empirical evidence on the 
magnitude of the wealth effects using a small structural model of the UK economy. 
Section 4 contains the empirical results from augmented Taylor rules. Section 4.1 
accounts for the effect of BoE independence on the inflation-policy rule parameter, 
and Section 4.2 compares the historical performance of the benchmark forward-
looking rule versus the asset augmented rule. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data description 
We employ monthly data on short-term interest rates, industrial production, 
Retail Price Index minus mortgage interest payments (RPIX), stock prices and house 
prices for the United Kingdom from October 1992 to January 2003. All data is 
obtained from Datastream, OECD Historical Statistics series. Our sample period 
commences with the establishment of an explicit inflation targeting regime on 
October 1992. An inflation target of 1-4 % was initially adopted and on June 1995 the 
                                                 
1 The theoretical foundation of this argument lays in pioneering research on the theory of inflation 
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target was reset at 2.5% or less. In addition, on May 1997 the Bank of England was 
awarded operational independence in setting interest rates.  
The (annualised) output gap, ty? , the difference between actual and potential 
output, is calculated via quadratic detrending of the industrial production series, as in 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998), and Nelson (2000). The 3-month Treasury Bill rate, 
Rt, is employed as a measure of the stance of the monetary policy2.  The annual 
change in stock prices, πtSP, house prices, πtHP, and retail prices, πt, is proxied by the 
12th difference of the natural logarithm of the monthly FTSE All Shares stock index, 
the Halifax house price index, and the (seasonally adjusted) RPIX respectively. We 
used annual, rather than monthly, changes for retail prices, stock prices and house 
prices since year on year changes on these variables are much more relevant for 
monetary policy decisions (Goodhart, 2001).  
   [FIGURE 1]  
As we see in Figure 1(a) stock prices have been far more volatile as compared 
to house prices. In the aftermath of the burst of the stock market bubble in 2000, the 
two series start diverging significantly, with house price inflation accelerating, while 
the stock market collapsed. The output gap in Figure 1(b) indicates a post-bubble 
weaker UK economy since it is generally declining after peaking in early 2001. 
Finally, the nominal interest rate is consistently above the strikingly stable (as 
compared to its 1970’s ‘rollercoaster’ behaviour) inflation rate. Standard Phillips-
Perron (PP) tests are employed in order to test for unit roots in our data. The results in 
Table 1 clearly indicate the rejection of the unit root null hypothesis at the usual levels 
of significance. Therefore we employ all the aforementioned variables at their levels. 
                                                                                                                                            
measurement by Alchian and Klein (1973).  
2 The actual interest rate used by the Bank of England as its instrument has varied over time, and has 
included Bank Rate (until September 1972), Minimum Lending Rate (1972-81), and the two-week 
Repo Rate (since 1996). The Treasury Bill rate has historically moved close with these instruments, 
and is available for the entire sample period. 
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    [TABLE 1] 
3. Asset Prices and the Real Economy 
 As Goodhart and Hofmann (2001) argue, from the early 1990’s many 
countries adopted explicit inflation targeting regimes as a response to the instability of 
the money demand function, which made monetary growth rates an unreliable proxy 
of monetary policy and future inflationary pressures. Simplified inflation targeting 
models include an aggregate supply and an aggregate demand equation and are used 
to derive optimal monetary policy reaction functions (see e.g. Svensson, 1997). 
Following Rudebusch and Svensson (1998), we use a model of the UK economy 
consisting of a aggregate supply, or Phillips curve, describing the dynamics of 
inflation and an aggregate demand, or IS curve, characterising the behaviour of the 
output gap.  
Due to the inconsistencies between purely forward-looking models and actual 
inflation and output data, many researchers (see e.g. the references provided in 
Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999) suggest the employment of “hybrid” Phillips- and IS-
curves, which include both backward- and forward-looking elements. We specify a 
hybrid empirical Phillips curve where current inflation depends upon past and 
expected future inflation and on past demand pressures: 
0 1 2 3[ ]t t i t t n t m tE yπ µ µ π µ π µ η− + −= + + + +?       (1) 
 
The backward-looking element in Equation 1 reflects inertia in inflation that is 
justified not only empirically, but also theoretically on the assumption that a fixed 
proportion of firms has backward-looking price setting behavior (see Galí and Gertler, 
1999). The forward-looking element derives from the rational expectations staggered-
contracting models of Taylor (1980), and Calvo (1983). The GMM estimates3 of the 
                                                 
3 GMM estimation with MA(12) autocorrelation correction has been used. The instrument set includes 
six lags of inflation, agricultural commodity prices, and the output gap.  The J-statistic indicates that 
the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected. 
 7
hybrid Phillips curve in 1.1 over the period 1992:10-2003:01 imply that the 
backward-looking component is stronger in UK data, as µ1 > µ2 . The estimated 
magnitude of µ1 is close to the value of 0.8 which has been used as central value by 
Batini and Haldane (1999) in simulations for the UK. The output gap coefficient, µ3, 
is positive and highly significant indicating that current demand pressures feed into 
higher future inflation. 
3 3 12 ˆ0.001 0.81 0.15 0.09
       (.001)    (.04)         (.05)        (.005)      
               SE = 0.003,     J-stat = 14.25 [0.38]
t t t t tyπ π π η− + −= − + + + +?
               (1.1) 
 The demand-side of the economy is modelled as a hybrid IS, that is consistent 
with dynamic optimising behaviour by the agents (micro-foundations) and also allows 
for some persistence in output. Thus, equation 2 allows the output gap to be a function 
of past and expected future output, lagged real interest rate, and lagged values of a 
vector, X,  of additional explanatory variables.  
'
0 1 2 3[ ]t t i t t n t s t k ty y E y i vλ λ λ λ− + − −= + + + + +ΩX? ? ?      (2) 
 
where, 
11
1
12
0
( ) ( )t t i t i
i
i R π− −
=
= −∑  is the twelve-month average ex post real interest rate. 
As we already pointed out there are many channels via which, changes in equity 
prices and house prices affect consumer wealth. Direct effects include the change in 
consumption plans as a response to swings in asset prices (Modigliani, 1971), while 
indirect effects operate mainly via households and firms’ balance sheets.  There is a 
growing consensus that, apart from the conventional explanatory variables, output is 
also determined by changes in consumption and investment demand induced by 
changes in the level of asset prices. Therefore, the aggregate demand function given 
by Equation 2 is estimated with GMM including house price inflation (Equation 2.1) 
and stock price inflation (Equation 2.2).  
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3 3 12 12 1ˆ0.01 0.03 0.91 0.30 0.08
      (.002)  (.03)        (.03)         (.05)         (.01) 
               SE = 0.008,     J-stat = 18.91 [0.48]
HP
t t t t t ty y y i vπ− + − −= + + − + +? ? ?
             (2.1) 
  
The results indicate that, in contrast to the aggregate supply, aggregate 
demand is more affected by its forward-looking component, since λ2 is  positive and 
significant while λ1 turns out to be insignificant. The one-year lagged real interest rate 
is negative and strongly significant, as expected. Finally, the coefficient of lagged 
house price changes shows that a 10 % increase in house prices boosts current 
aggregate demand by a factor of 0.8 %, indicating significant wealth effects4.  
3 3 12 12 2ˆ0.01 0.007 0.78 0.55 0.04
      (.002)   (.04)          (.03)         (.06)         (.01) 
              SE = 0.009,     J-stat = 16.12 [0.64]
SP
t t t t t ty y y i vπ− + − −= + + − + +? ? ?
             (2.2) 
The estimated coefficients in 2.2 reveal similar patterns. Future output is strongly 
significant, real interest rate affects output negatively with a lag, and stock price 
inflation exerts a positive impact on aggregate demand. The magnitude of the wealth 
effect depends among other factors on the share of the respective asset in private 
sector wealth, with housing constituting the most significant asset in the households’ 
portfolio in most countries. Indeed, we find that the magnitude of the wealth effect 
due to stock price increases is much smaller than the effect due to house price 
increases. The coefficient of stock price inflation is half the coefficient of stock price 
inflation (0.04 as compared to 0.08) a result that is in line with previous evidence by 
Goodhart and Hofmann (2001) for the UK. Using a panel of 14 developed economies 
Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2001) also find that the housing market appears to be 
more important than the stock market in affecting the real economy.  
Having demonstrated that movements in asset prices affect future aggregate 
demand and consequently also future inflation, in the next section we shall focus on 
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the key empirical question of this paper, that is, what has been the response of the 
monetary policy instrument to asset price inflation. 
 
4.  An Alternative Taylor Rule Specification 
It is generally assumed that the monetary policy interest rate instrument 
responds with fixed, positive weights to deviations of inflation from a pre-specified 
target, and deviations of output from its potential level (Taylor, 1993). The past 
decade has seen a vast amount of empirical and theoretical work considering 
monetary policy reaction functions. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) present 
econometric estimates of the Taylor rule coefficients for the United States. Nelson 
(2000) provides empirical evidence for the United Kingdom under alternative 
monetary policy regimes, over the period 1972-97, prior to the Bank of England 
(BoE) receiving operational independence.  Focusing on the inflation-targeting period 
1992-1997, Nelson’s results suggest that a forward-looking looking Taylor rule 
outperforms a backward looking specification. His results contradict those of Kuttner 
and Posen (1999).  
In contrast with Nelson, who used quarterly data, Kuttner and Posen employed 
monthly data over the period October 1992-December 1997 and found a coefficient of 
zero on inflation. Other important differences with the Nelson study include the use of 
the unemployment rate, instead of the real GDP for the construction of the output gap 
proxy, and the employment of the annualised month-to-month rather than annual 
inflation rate. As Nelson argues though, the use of annual inflation in the estimated 
rule is crucial for the results since the BoE’s inflation target has always been 
expressed in terms of the annual (year-ended), rather than the monthly inflation rate.  
                                                                                                                                            
4 Throughout the last 3 years of house price increases, the average annual house price inflation has 
been 12% in nominal terms, or about 10 % in real terms. 
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Following Clarida et al. (1998) we assume that the Central Bank has an 
operating target for the nominal short term interest rate that is based upon the state of 
the economy. In the benchmark model the state of the economy is characterised by the 
evolution of the output gap and expected inflation. This forward looking behaviour is 
consistent with a central bank that operates in the context of an inflation targeting 
regime (Kent and Lowe, 1997). In each period, the actual interest rate partially adjusts 
towards the target value. Svensson (1997) justifies the partial adjustment mechanism 
by including the change in interest rates in the Central Bank’s loss function. 
Combining the target rule with the partial adjustment mechanism we obtain the 
empirical form of the monetary policy reaction function: 
{ }* 1
1 1
1 ( [ ] ) [ ]
l l
t i t t n t t i t i t
i i
R a E E y R uϕ β π π γ ϕ+ − −
= =
 = − + − + + +  ∑ ∑?    (3) 
where 
1
[0,1]
l
i
i
ϕ
=
∈∑  measuring the degree of interest rate smoothing, π* is the inflation 
target (2.5 %), and α = r*- βπ* , with r*  denoting the long-run equilibrium nominal 
interest rate. Due to the fact that monetary policymakers cannot observe ty?  when 
setting Rt, we replace the actual value of the output gap with its expected level, 
1[ ]t tE y− ? ; see McCallum and Nelson, 1999, and Orphanides et al., 2000 for a further 
discussion of the uncertainties faced by the policymaker with respect to output.  The 
error term, ut, represents a white noise monetary policy shock. We consider an 
inflation forecast horizon of one year, therefore we set n equal to 12 in our monthly 
sample.  
In order to estimate the model, unknown expected future variables are 
replaced with their ex post realised values. This leads us to Equation 45: 
                                                 
5 The disturbance term in Equation 2 is a linear combination of the inflation and output gap forecast 
errors and the exogenous monetary policy shock ut, ( ) ( ){ }1
1
(1 ) [ ] [ ]
l
t i t n t t n t t t t
i
E y E y uω ϕ β π π γ+ + −
=
=− − − + − +∑ ? ?  
 11
{ }*
1 1
1 ( )
l l
t i t n t i t i t
i i
R a y Rϕ β π π γ ϕ ω+ −
= =
 = − + − + + +  ∑ ∑?     (4) 
The set of orthogonality conditions implied by Equation (4) is: 
{ }*
1 1
1 ( ) 0
l l
t t i t n t i t i t
i i
E R a y Rϕ β π π γ ϕ+ −
= =
  − − + − + + Ζ =    ∑ ∑?    (5) 
where Zt represents all the variables in the Central Bank’s information set available at 
time t when the interest rate is chosen. Zt is a vector of variables that are orthogonal to 
ωt. These instruments are lagged variables that help forecasting inflation and output, 
and contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the exogenous monetary 
policy shock, ut. The benchmark reaction function given by Equation (4) is estimated 
using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). The instruments employed in the 
estimation include a constant and six lags of the nominal short-term interest rate, 
inflation, output gap, and a world commodity price index (agricultural raw materials). 
Since the number of instruments is greater than the number of elements of the 
parameter vector [φi, α, β, γ], we test for the validity of the over-identifying 
restrictions using Hansen’s  J-statistic. As pointed out by Clarida et al. (1998), failure 
to reject orthogonality implies that the Central Bank considers lagged variables in its 
reaction function, only to the extent that they forecast future inflation or output. 
The GMM estimation results in Table 2, column 2, indicate that the 
benchmark specification satisfies the dynamic stability criterion since the estimated 
inflation coefficient, β, is greater than one (1.02). If β was smaller than the stability 
threshold of one, then this would imply a positively sloped aggregated demand, with 
output decreasing in response to an inflation shock (Taylor, 1999).  The output gap 
coefficient, γ, is positive and statistically significant at the 1 % level, although quite 
modest in magnitude (0.03). Its estimate implies that, holding expected inflation 
constant, one-percent increase in the level of output gap induces the BoE to raise 
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interest rates by 3 basis points. This result is consistent with those reported by Martin 
and Milas (2001) who employed quarterly UK data.  Therefore, during the inflation-
targeting period that we consider, U.K. monetary policy has put more weight on price 
stability than output stabilisation. The sum of the interest rate smoothing parameters is 
close to one (0.92) indicating a high level of persistence in short term interest rates. 
Finally, the J-statistic indicates that the over-identifying restrictions of the benchmark 
model are not rejected.  
    [TABLE 2] 
 As pointed out in the previous section, asset prices contain important 
information about future aggregate demand and consequently inflation pressures. 
Also, there are theoretical arguments in favour of including asset price inflation in the 
reaction function of the Central Bank. Cecchetti et al. (2000) find that, on the basis of 
simulations, it would be desirable to include asset inflation in the Taylor rule. 
Therefore, we proceed by considering alternatives to our benchmark specification, by 
allowing asset prices to enter in the Taylor rule. The augmented reaction functions we 
consider are of the form: 
{ }* '1
1 1
1 ( [ ] ) [ ]
l l
t i t t n t t t i t i t
i i
R a E E y Rϕ β π π γ ϕ ε+ − −
= =
 = − + − + + + +  ∑ ∑ΘX?   (6) 
where '1[ ... ]t t jtx x=X , and  '1[ ... ]jθ θ=Θ  denote the vector of j-additional 
explanatory variables, and the relevant coefficient vector respectively. In the cases 
that we will examine, Xt contains contemporaneous house price and/or stock price 
inflation. We use contemporaneous, and not expected, asset price inflation due to the 
well known difficulties involved in forecasting asset price movements. Also, weak 
form efficiency implies that the current asset price reflects all past history, thus there 
is no need to incorporate lags. 
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 First, we allow annual house price inflation to enter the reaction function. The 
results are presented in Table 2, column 3. The house inflation coefficient, θ1, is 
positive and highly significant. Monetary policy tightens in response to increases in 
house prices: a one percent rise in house prices increases interest rates by 15 basis 
points. The response to expected inflation is stronger than in the benchmark case, with 
a smaller standard error.  The estimated inflation coefficient is 1.6 close to the 
theoretical value of 1.5, as suggested by Taylor (1993), thus ensuring that real rates 
increase in response to inflationary pressures. Second, we add stock price changes in 
the benchmark model. The estimated coefficient, θ2, (Table 2, column 3) is still 
positive and statistically significant but its value (0.06) is much smaller as compared 
to house price coefficient. When both asset returns are included (Table 2, column 4), 
the magnitude of the coefficients confirms that house prices enter more significantly 
the monetary policy reaction function, since θ1>θ2. As in the benchmark specification, 
the J-statistic cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions. 
 
4.1. Accounting for Independence 
 There is a wide consensus among academics and practitioners that central 
bank independence produces lower average inflation (Cukierman, 1992).  Spiegel 
(1998) finds that the BoE independence on May 1997 had a significant negative 
impact on agents’ inflationary expectations. In order to account for the change in the 
underlying regime and preferences we allow the expected inflation coefficient to be 
different post-independence. We therefore introduce a multiplicative dummy variable, 
Dt, in the reaction function, where Dt = 0 prior to independence and 1 onwards:  
{ }* '1
1 1
1 ( )( [ ] ) [ ]
l l
t i t t t n t t t i t i t
i i
R a D E E y R vϕ β µ π π γ ϕ+ − −
= =
 = − + + − + + + +  ∑ ∑ΘX?  (7) 
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We would expect the dummy coefficient, µ, to be positive and significant indicating 
that the BoE becomes more inflation-averse, which leads to lower inflation 
expectations.   
        [TABLE 3] 
The results in Table 3 confirm our predictions. In the benchmark model, µ 
is equal to 0.41 suggesting that post-independence the BoE reacts to one percent 
increase in expected inflation by raising interest rates by an additional 41 basis 
points. Even when we control for the effect of asset prices, the dummy remains 
positive and significant, reaffirming a higher degree of inflation aversion as a 
result of independence. We notice that the magnitude of the estimated asset 
inflation coefficients does not change. The monetary policy response to house 
prices is always stronger than the one with respect to stock prices. For instance, in 
the case of both assets entering the reaction function, θ1 is equal to 0.13 and 
significant at the 1% level, while θ2 is equal to 0.03 and significant at the 10%.The 
coefficient of house price inflation in particular is almost double the coefficient of 
stock price inflation. This supports the findings in the previous section where we 
reported a strong link between house price inflation and aggregate demand which 
induces policy makers to track more closely developments in the housing market.  
 
4.2.  Historical Performance  
In this section we examine the historical performance of our estimated Taylor 
rules against the actual policy setting of the BoE. In Figure 2, we plot the implied 
target rates from the dummy augmented model versus the actual short term interest 
rate. As Clarida et al. (1998) point out, employment of the target rate as opposed to 
the fitted rate, that includes the lagged interest rate, allows for a better comparison of 
the alternative specifications. Figure 2(a) uses the target interest rate implied by the 
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benchmark model, while Figure 2(b) uses the target rate implied by the asset price 
augmented policy rule6.   
     [FIGURE 2] 
It is clear that the benchmark target rate underperforms in capturing actual 
Central Bank behaviour. With the exception of two short periods at the beginning 
and the end of our sample, actual interest rates were consistently higher than the 
rule predicted value. Thus, the BoE was far tighter than the simple benchmark 
forward looking model would predict. When asset prices are allowed to be one of 
the state variables monitored by the Central Bank, the picture becomes clearer. As 
we notice in Figure 2(b), the target rate tracks the general trend of the actual 
interest rate for most of the period under investigation. Indeed, summary statistics 
presented in Table 4 indicate that when asset prices are not considered, the target 
interest rate is on average more than 1 % lower than the actual rate. Thus, the 
benchmark Taylor rule doesn’t seem to explain well interest rate setting in the 
UK. The alternative specification produces a target rate which is much closer to 
the actual behaviour in terms of both mean and variability.  
   [TABLE 4] 
During the period of strong stock market performance prior to the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, actual monetary policy was looser than the model would 
predict; and then it was somewhat tighter during the first years of independence. 
One possible interpretation of these findings is that the BoE was trying to signal 
its commitment to keep inflation on track, even though some would argue that the 
falling stock market required lower interest rates. A notable divergence of the 
target from the actual occurs after 2001, when the large increases in house prices 
call for much tighter policy than the one followed.  
                                                 
6 The target interest rate in Figure 1(b) has been constructed considering both house price and stock 
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5.  Conclusions 
 This paper examines the empirical reaction of monetary policy to asset prices 
using forward-looking Taylor rule models of interest rates. The intuition for monetary 
policy to consider asset prices lays on the fact that consumption wealth effects and 
investment balance sheet effects may destabilise aggregate demand and inflation, the 
two main variables of interest for the CB. Changes in real property prices and stock 
prices have significant impact on households’ consumption and firms’ investment. 
Using UK data over the period October 1992 to January 2003 we show that 
movements in asset prices, especially house prices, have a significant positive impact 
on aggregate demand. Demand pressures feed into higher future inflation, thus there is 
scope for an inflation targeting CB to consider asset inflation in its forward-looking 
reaction function.  
 The main contribution of our paper is to find that policymakers in the UK 
appear to take into account both stock price inflation and house price inflation when 
setting interest rates, with the results suggesting that they are more concerned about 
developments in the property market. When the standard forward-looking Taylor rule 
is augmented by house prices and stock prices, the estimated coefficient of house 
price changes is always greater. The benchmark Taylor rule conditions short term 
interest rates upon expected inflation and the output gap and fails to provide an 
accurate characterisation of actual policy. When asset prices are included in the 
reaction function, the implied target rate describes the general trends of the actual 
interest rate much better.  In addition, we model the effect of Central Bank 
independence on the policy preferences towards expected inflation. We find that the 
relationship between asset price inflation and interest rates is robust, and that inflation 
aversion increased post-independence.   
                                                                                                                                            
price inflation.  
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1: Annual House Price and Stock Price inflation, 1992:10-2003:01. 
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Figure 2: Actual and Target interest rate, 1992:10-2002:01. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Unit Root tests  
 
Variables Phillips Perron t-statistic 
R -3.620234 ** 
ygap -4.529641 *** 
π -4.001144 ** 
πSP -3.803221 ** 
πHP -3.748362 ** 
 
Note:  
1. In order to correct for serial correlation the Phillips Perron (PP) test uses a non-parametric 
estimator of the variance-covariance matrix. A truncation lag of twelve was employed. An 
intercept and a linear trend term were included in the PP regressions.  
2. The reported t-statistics test the null hypothesis that the variable contains a unit root. *, **, 
*** indicate rejection of the unit root - null at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance level 
respectively. 
 
Table 2: GMM Estimates of Forward Looking Taylor Rule, 1992:10-2003:1 
 
  
Benchmark 
Model 
 
'[ ]HPt tX π=  
 
'[ ]SPt tX π=  
 
'[ , ]HP SPt t tX π π=
 
a  2.59 * 4.00 *** 2.51 *** 4.56 *** 
β  1.02 * 1.60 *** 1.01 *** 1.82 *** 
γ  0.03 *** 0.04 *** 0.08 *** 0.02 *** 
1
l
i
i
ϕ
=
∑  0.92 *** 0.91 *** 0.91 *** 0.83 *** 
1θ  - 0.15 *** - 0.12 *** 
2θ  - - 0.06 *** 0.07 *** 
S.E. of Reg. 0.0023 0.0022 0.023 0.0030 
J- Stat. 14.10 17.38 21.19 15.51 
 
 
Table 3: GMM Estimates of Forward Looking Taylor Rule adjusted for the 
Effect of Bank of England Independence, 1992:10-2003:1  
 
 
 
 
Benchmark 
Model 
 
'[ ]HPt tX π=  
 
'[ ]SPt tX π=  
 
'[ , ]HP SPt t tX π π=
 
a  4.53 ** 5.85 *** 3.27 ** 5.62  *** 
β  1.81 ** 2.35 *** 1.30 *** 2.25 *** 
γ  0.03 *** 0.04 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 
µ  0.41 * 0.47 ** 0.61 *** 0.40 * 
1
l
i
i
ϕ
=
∑  0.92 *** 0.88 *** 0.89 *** 0.87 *** 
1θ  - 0.12 *** - 0.13 *** 
2θ  - - 0.04 *** 0.03*  
S.E. of Reg. 0.0022 0.0024 0.0022 0.0025 
J- Stat. 13.30 15.76 23.18  15.78 
 
Note:  
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1. Estimates are obtained by GMM estimation with correction for MA(12) autocorrelation. 
Two-stage least squares estimation is employed to obtain the initial estimates of the optimal 
weighting matrix.  
2. In the benchmark model the instruments used are a constant and lags 1 to 6 of the nominal 
short term interest rate, inflation, output gap, and a world commodity price index (agricultural 
raw materials).  In the models that include asset price inflation, lags 1 to 6 of the relevant 
asset price inflation variable are also included. 
3. J-stat denotes the test statistic for overidentifying restrictions.  
4. *, **, *** indicate level of significance of  10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Actual and Taylor Rule Target Interest Rate, 
1992:10-2002:1.  
 
 
 Actual Target Benchmark 
Target with Asset 
Prices 
 Mean  5.83  4.42  5.92 
 Median  5.87  4.57  6.03 
 Maximum  7.46  6.04  8.24 
 Minimum  3.78  2.25  4.11 
 Std. Dev.  0.82  0.77  0.85 
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